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It has been stated that there is no title less understood by the courts or more
obscure in the textbooks than that of the crime of "attempt." The courts, there-
fore, should not resort unnecessarily to this concept. The court did so in Com-
monwealth v. Haines.1 In this case, the defendant, intending to aid bookmakers
to evade arrest, telephoned to their headquarters to inform them of an impending
raid. The bookmaker had left the premises a few hours earlier.
The defendant was not accused or convicted of the crime of "attempt," but
of the crime of malfeasance in office "by attempting" to aid and abet the book-
maker to evade arrest and prosecution for bookmaking. In sustaining the convic-
tion the court, however, resorted to the concept of the crime of "attempt," and
said: "There are two elements involved in an indictable attempt: first, the in-
tent to commit the crime; and, second, an ineffectual act done toward its commis-
sion, both of which were shown in this case."
It is not quite that simple. The accomplishment of the object which the de-
fendant intended was, under the circumstances, impossible; and the courts have ex-
perienced great difficulty in deciding whether one may be held guilty of an at-
tempt to commit a crime if the commission of the crime is under the circumstances
impossible. The court did state that the act done must be "sufficiently proximate"
to the intended result, and held that the facts of the case satisfied this rule because
"if the message had been a few hours earlier it would probably have accomplished
its purpose."
BATTERY
A crime is composed of two elements: (1) a particular physical condition;
and, (2) a particular mental condition. The physical element of a crime con-
sists of an act causing or tending to cause a certain result. The physical element
of the crime of battery is an act causing a contact with the person of another.
The mental element of a crime is more complex. It is well settled that the
physical activity which is a factor of the physical element of a crime must have
been intended. A spasm is not an act. But in order to hold a person criminally
responsible for a result which his act has caused it is not always necessary that he
should have intended that his act cause that result. A person is sometimes respon-
sible for a result of his act which he did not intend to cause because (1) he in-
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tended to cause another wrongful result, or (2) he was not sufficiently careful to
avoid causing the result, or (3) merely because his act caused the result.
The Superior Court has recently held that the crime of battery requires not
only that the act causing the contact should have been intended but that the actor
should have intended that his act should produce the contact.2
The tendency to extend criminal responsibility for results unintentionally
but negligently caused has been characteristic of the criminal law for centuries.
The most striking illustration of this tendency in modern times has been the de-
velopment of the doctrine that negligence furnishes a basis for a conviction of as-
sault and battery. The concept of a negligent battery seems to be fully developed
in many states.
The decision of the Pennsylvania court produces the remarkable result that
one may be held criminally responsible for an unintended contact which causes
the death of another but may not be held criminally responsible for an unintended
contact which produces serious bodily harm.
In justification of its decision the court said: "If one hits another intention-
ally and knocks him down, that is a plain case of assault and battery; but if one
slips on an icy pavement and in the act of falling unintentionally hits another
thereby knocking him down, that is not an assault and battery, for the intent to
hit the other person is wholly lacking." The court quite obviously confused the
intent to act with the intent to cause a contact as the result of acting.
CONSPIRACY
Crimes are local in two respects. The general rule is that the locus delicti
furnishes not only the law by which a crime is to be defined and punished but also
the jurisdiction to punish it.
The crime of conspiracy consists of the agreement between two or more
persons to do an unlawful act. No overt act in pursuance of the agreement need
be alleged in the indictment nor proved at the trial to sustain a conviction of con-
spiracy. The agreement is the offense.
It has been held, however, that one may be convicted of a conspiracy in any
county or state where an act in furtherance of the conspiracy is committed by any
one of the conspirators.
It seems rather remarkable that an act which is not a part of the crime should
furnish the basis for convicting one of the crime in a place other than that in which
the crime was committed. The agreement, it was said, is renewed as to all the
conspirators, whether present or not, by the commission of the act by any one of
them.
The rule as applied to counties of the same state is not particularly objection-
able. But the same rule has been applied in regard to different states. The courts
2Com. v. Ireland, 149 Pa. Super. 298, 27 A. (2d) 746 (1942).
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have not distinguished the question as to the proper place of trial of a crime com-
mitted within the state, which is a question of venue, from the question of the
jurisdiction of the trial of a crime which is really committed entirely within another
state.
The Superior Court has recently reasserted the rule as to counties.3 The rule
as applied to states may give rise to some perplexing questions of conflict of laws.
A case dealing with another principle of conspiracy law was Commonwealth v.
Daley.4 It was held that it was a criminal conspiracy to agree to violate Section
22 of Article XIX of the City Charter Act of 1929, by directing the false mark-
ing and grading of applicants who had taken a civil service examination, even
though the examinations were void because Sections 13 and 14 of Article XIX,
regulating the giving of the examinations, had not been complied with. The
court stated that under any other holding Section 22 could easily be rendered
nugatory, cited one case in support of its opinion, and did not clearly state the
principle upon which it relied.
The principle usually stated in support of similar decisions, of which there
are many, is that it is immaterial that the accomplishment of the object of the con-
spiracy is impossible.5
CRIMES AND CIVIL INJURIES
The theory of the common law is that where an act constitutes both a crime
and a civil injury the punishment for the crime cannot be imposed and redress for
the civil injury awarded in a single judicial proceeding. Exceptions to this rule
have been created by statute. The general theory is illustrated by the decision
in Commonwealth v. Widmeyer.6  A proceeding against a husband for non-sup-
port was instituted under the Act of 1867, which is not a criminal statute and
whose "purpose is the protection of wife and children," and before its comple-
tion the proceeding was shifted to and subsequent steps were taken under an
"entirely distinct and strictly criminal statute," the Act of 1903, whose "purpose
is the punishment of deserting husbands."
The court ordered that the defendant pay (1) the costs of his extradi-
tion, and (2) pay the wife $100 a month for support. "One charged with non-
support under the Act of 1867 may not be extradited as for a crime." Consequent-
ly an order to pay the costs of extradition must have been made under the Act
of 1903.
Under the Act of 1903 the court may enter an order for support but only
after a conviction in a jury trial. The defendant was not tried by a jury but was
ordered by the court to plead guilty to a charge of desertion and non-support un-
der the Act of 1903.
3Com. v. Mezick, 147 Pa. Super. 410, 24 A. (2d) 762 (1942).
4147 Pa. Super. 545, 24 A. (2d) 91 (1942).
6
See 15 C J. S. 1070.
6149 Pa. Super. 91, 26 A. (2d) 125 (1942).
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The Superior Court held that there was no authority for mixing what should
be separate proceedings under the respective Acts, and stated: "The order of the
court is reversed, the record remitted to the court below with directions to have
this case, which was evidently considered by the court below as a misdemeanor,
as an indictment was found, tried before a jury."
CRIMINAL STATUS
The law may make criminal a course of conduct or mode of life without re-
gard to the commission of any one particular crime. It may make criminal a
criminal status not due to the perpetration of a specific offense, presently or in the
past. This would seem to be the purpose of the Act of 1901, 7 which is entitled,
"An Act relating to the arrest and punishment of professional thieves, burglars,
and pickpockets," and of section eight hundred and twenty-one of the Penal Code
of 1939.8
It has been held, however, that under the provisions of these Acts, persons may
be incarcerated without the right to trial by jury, "although they are not charged
with any crime," that "the gravamen of the offense charged under the Act con-
sists not of being a professional thief, burglar, or pickpocket, but of frequenting
any place for an unlawful purpose," and that "the purpose of the Act is to prevent
the commission of crime rather than to punish it.'' 9 The criminal law never
punishes persons simply for the purpose of punishing them. A cardinal princi-
ple of the criminal law, however, is that it prevents the commission of crime by
punishing it. The Acts of 1901 and 1939 are not exceptions to this rule. Punish-
ment of professional criminals under these Acts will prevent them, temporarily at
least, from doing the same act again, and may prevent or deter others. Enforce-
ment of the Act does prevent the commission of crime by allowing the arrest of a
person not for a specific crime but because he has a criminal character and a crim-
inal intent although he has not executed the criminal intent or done any act in
furtherance of it for which he could be arrested or punished for an "attempt."
His arrest prevents the execution of his intent, but his subsequent punishment for
having a criminal status and entertaining a criminal intent will tend to prevent
him and deter others from acquiring a similar character and entertaining a similar
intent.
PERJURY
The Romanesque law of continental Europe rested fundamentally upon a
system of "legal proofs" which was in reality a numerical system. According to
this system a single witness was in general not sufficient to prove a fact. For
the proof of a majority of issues or facts two witnesses were necessary and suffi-
cient.
7P.L. 492, sec. 1, 18 PS. 2831.
8P.L. 872, sec. 821, 18 PS. 4821.
9 Com. v. Ginsberg, 143 Pa. Super. 323, 18 A. (2d) 121 (1941); Com. ,. Bey, 150 Pa.
Super. 93. 27 A. (2d) 457 (1942).
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This system was not adopted by the common law. The general rule of the
common law is that one witness may be sufficient in every case. To this general
rule there arose the single exception that one witness alone, without corroborating
circumstances, is not sufficient to convict one of perjury. This exception to the
general rule, although an incongruous element in the common law system of
proofs, may have had at one time justification in the experience of the courts, but
in modern times there are cogent reasons for believing that the rule has outlived
its usefulness.
The general rule as to perjury has been held not to be applicable where the
defendant has made contradictory statements under oath. "It seems clear that the
rule here suffers an exception and that by mere comparison the jury may deter-
mine the falsity. The purpose of the rule is to protect the accused from the
false testimony of a single witness swearing against him; here no attempt is
made to condemn him upon the credit of another person; the rule's protection is
not needed; and the rule should fall with the reason."' 1
But the exception does not mean that one must be convicted simply because
he made contradictory statements under oath. It is not truu that "where conflict-
ing statements are made under oath there is no doubt that the person making
them has committed perjury," nor that "the commission of perjury is proved by
conflicting statements under oath without more." The witness may have be-
lieved that each statement was true at the time he made it.
Nor does the exception mean that an indictment may "charge perjury in the
alternative without being required to elect as between the two contradictory
statements." The indictment must allege which one of the statements is false
and the prosecution must prove the falsity of that statement.
May the falsity of the statement alleged in the indictment be proved simply
by proof of the contradictory statement? There is authority to tht effect that it
may not. The Pennsylvania Court in a recent case seems to say that it may, but
"the nature of the statement alleged to have been false makes it perfectly clear
that the falsity must have been stated knowingly.""1 Corroborative evidence of
the falsity of the statement may be needed. It is not, however, invariably, needed.
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
In early times a person found in possession of stolen goods immediately after
the theft was liable to summary punishment without the benefit of an ordinary
trial. Later it was held that such possession created a presumption of guilt which
required a conviction unless satisfactorily explained. The modern view is that
such possession is sufficient to justify an inference of guilt but not enough to
create a legal presumption against the accustd. There is no presumption in a
proper sense of that term.
107 WI.MORE, EVIDENCE (3rd. Ed. 1940), sec. 2043.
liCom. v. Sumrak, 148 Pa. Super. 412, 25 A- (2d) 605 (1942).
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But courts still continue to use the language of presumption without making
it dear whether the language is intended to mean (1) merely that such possession
alone is sufficient evidence upon which the jury may decide to convict if they so
desire, or (2) that such possession alone creates a presumption, i.e., places on the
accused a duty of presenting evidence of explanation so that if he fails to do so
the jury must convict him.
This was done in a recent Pennsylvania case in which the court charged that
recent possession of stolen property raises a strong presumption of guilt.12
On appeal this instruction was justified because the trial judge meant "a
presumption of fact which if not explained away to the satisfaction of the jury
warranted a finding in accordance therewith" and "there was no likelihood that
the instructions were misunderstood."
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF ANOTHER
The rules governing the criminal responsibility of a principal or master for
the acts of his agent or servant differ in origin, terminology, and content from
the rules governing the civil responsibility of a principal or master for the tort
of his agent or servant.
The doctrine of respondeat superior, as developed in thl law of torts, under
which one is civilly liable for the acts of his agent or servant even if the acts were
unauthorized or forbidden, provided they were committed by the agent or servant
acting within the course of business and within the scope of his employment, will
not as a general rule constitute a basis for criminal responsibility.
Criminal responsibility through the operation of the doctrine of respondeat
superior may be imposed by statute, and in recent times there has been a tendency
to hold that certain statutes expressly or impliedly impose such responsibility. This
tendency is illustrated by a recent Pennsylvania case. 13
An investigator for the Milk Control Commission went to the defendant's
farm and asked him where he could buy milk. The defendant directed the in-
vestigator to the dairymaid, who sold the investigator milk at a price lower than
that fixed by the Milk Control Commission. The defendant was held criminally
responsible for the act of the dairymaid. The court applied the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior unavowedly and gave the following reasons for its decision:
1. The offense was statutory and guilty knowledge or intent was not an
essential element of it. But it does not follow that because a crime does not re-
quire guilty knowledge or intent, one should be convicted for his servant's unau-
thorized commission of it or vice versa. The dispensing with the usual require-
l 2 Com. v. Lindie, 147 Pa. Super. 335, 24 A. (2d) 39 (1942).
l3 Cora. v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Super 328, 22 A. (2d) 299 (1941).
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ment of guilty knowledge or intent and the imposition of criminal responsibility
for the unauthorized acts of one's servant are parallel but disconnected results
flowing from a common cause.
2. The defendant should not be permitted "to hide behind his own negli-
gence." But there was no evidence that the defendant had been negligent.
3' "A principal is prima facie liable for the illegal acts of his agent done in
the general course of illegal business authorized by his principal." But the de-
fendant was not engaged in an illegal business.
4. "The unlawful sale by the servant is prima facie evidence of assent there-
to by the master." The principles of civil liability are thus in reality substituted
for the principle of criminal liability by a resort to a presumption.
The court said that "when the defendant indicated to the purchaser that his
dairymaid was in charge of sales, he became responsible for her acts." That is
the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Carlisle, Penna. WALTER HARRISON HITCHLER
